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Abstract 
This article develops a model to examine the equilibrium behavior of the time 
nconsistency problem in a continuous time economy with stochastic and endogenized 
distortion. First, the authors introduce the notion of sequentially rational equilibrium, 
and show that the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation 
strategies for stochastic setting. The conditions for the existence of sequentially 
rational equilibrium are provided. Then, the concept of sequentially rational 
stochastically stable equilibrium is introduced. The authors compare the relative 
stability between the cooperative behavior and uncooperative behavior, and show that 
the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational 
stochastically stable equilibrium and the uncooperative equilibrium is sequentially 
rational stochastically unstable equilibrium. In the long run, the zero inflation monetary 
policies are inherently more stable than the discretion rules, and once established, 
they tend to persist for longer periods of the time. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Time inconsistency is an interesting problem in macroeconomics in general, and 
monetary policy in particular. Although technologies, preferences, and information are 
the same at different times, the policymaker’s optimal policy chosen at time t1 differs 
from the optimal policy for t1 chosen at t0 < t1. The study of time inconsistency is 
important. It not only provides positive theories that help us to understand the 
incentives faced by policymakers and provides the 
________________________________________________________ 
*Received July 25, 2005; revised December 4, 2006. Sponsored by the National 
Natural Science Foundationof China (70602012), Texas Advanced Research Program 
as well as from the Bush Program in the Economics of Public Policy, the Private 
Enterprise Research Center, and the Lewis Faculty Fellowship at Texas A&M 
University. 
698 ACTA MATHEMATICA SCIENTIA Vol.28 Ser.B
natural starting point for attempts to explain the actual behavior of policymakers and actual
policy outcomes, but also requires one to design policy-making institutions. Such a normative
task can help one understand how institutional structures affect policy outcomes.
This problem was first noted by Kydland and Prescott [4]. Several solutions were proposed
to deal with this problem since then. Barro and Gordon [1] were the first to build a game model
to analyze “reputation” of monetary policy.
A second solution is the basis of the incentive contracting approach to monetary policy.
Persson and Tabellini [7], Walsh [12], and Svensson [10] developed models by using this ap-
proach. A third solution is built on the legislative approach. The major academic contribution
in this area was by Rogoff [8].
Among these approaches, the “reputation” problem is the key. If reputation consider-
ation discourages the monetary authorities from attempting surprise inflation, then, legal or
contracting constraints on monetary authorities are unnecessary and may be harmful.
The main questions on reputation are when and how the policymaker chooses inflation
optimally to minimize welfare loss, and, whether the punishment can induce the policymaker
to choose zero inflation. The conclusions of Barro-Gorden models are: first, there exists a
zero-inflation Nash equilibrium if the punishment for the policymaker deviating from zero-
inflation is large enough. However, this equilibrium is not sequentially rational over a finite
time horizon. The only sequentially rational equilibrium is achieved if the policymaker chooses
discretionary inflation and the public expects it. Only over an infinite time horizon one can
get a low-inflation equilibrium. Otherwise, the policymaker would be sure in the last period
to produce the discretionary outcome whatever the public’s expectation were and, by working
backward, would be expected to do the same in the first period. Secondly, there are multiple
Nash equilibria and there is no mechanism to choose between them.
This article develops a continuous time model of central bank at the spirit of Kydland and
Prescott, and Barro and Gordon. The main differences between our model and previous models
are the following two assumptions: (i) the natural rate of output∗∗ is a Brownian motion; (ii)
the distortion of the economy is correlated to the natural rate.
The reason that we use assumption (i) is that the most recent literature shares (see Salemi
[9]) the view that the natural rate changes over time and specifies the natural rate as a random
walk without drift seems a plausible assumption for U.S. unemployment data.
The key aspect of this monetary time inconsistency problem is the distortion which arises
from the labor-market distortions and the political pressure on the central bank. Most often,
some appeal is made to the presence of labor-market distortions, for example, a wage tax.
Because the larger scale of the economy implies the larger wage tax, it seems reasonable for us
to assume that the distortion is an increasing function of the scale of the economy. We use a
linear function to approximate this function.
In this article, we use the optimal stopping theory to study the time inconsistency problem
in monetary policy with the continuous time model. By using the optimal stopping theory and
∗∗The natural rate of output depends on the natural rate of unemployment. Friedman showed that monetary
policy could not be used to achieve full unemployment. Unfortunately, inflation starts accelerating before full
unemployment is reached. The best a nation can do is settle for the lowest level of unemployment that will not
begin accelerating inflation. Friedman called this point the ”natural rate of unemployment”(see Salemi [9]).
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introducing the notions of sequentially rational equilibria, we give the conditions under which
the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies. We provide
the conditions for the existence of sequentially rational equilibrium.
We argue that the traditional concepts of equilibrium are not satisfactory as a predictor
of long run behavior when the game is subjected to persistent stochastic shocks. The concept
of sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium is introduced. Then, we compare the
relative stability between the cooperative behavior and uncooperative behavior, and show that
the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational stochasti-
cally stable equilibrium and the uncooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a
sequentially rational stochastically unstable equilibrium.
The results obtained in the article imply that, in the long run, the zero inflation monetary
policies are inherently more stable than the discretion rules, and once established, they tend to
persist for longer periods of the time.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 will set up the model and provides a solu-
tion for the optimal stopping problem faced by the policymaker. In Section 3, we study the
equilibrium behavior. The stochastic stability of this monetary game is discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 gives the conclusion.
2 Model
2.1 The Setup
We consider a continuous time game theoretical model with two players: the policymaker
and the public. The policymaker’s strategy space is R+×L[0, T ], from which the policymaker is
to choose an action (τ, {πt}t∈T ). Here, τ is the time that the policymaker changes his monetary
policy from the zero-inflation rule to a discretion rule; πt is the inflation rate chosen by the
policymaker at time t; T is the lifetime of the policymaker which can be finite or infinite; and
L[0, T ] is the class of Lebesgue integrable functions defined on [0, T ]. The public’s strategy space
is L[0, T ], from which the public is to choose an action ({πet }t∈T ). Here, πet is the expected
inflation rate formed by the public at time t.
Suppose that, at the beginning, the policymaker commits an inflation rate π0 = 0, and
the public believes it so that πe0 = π0 = 0. The policymaker has the right to switch from the
zero-inflation to a discretion rule πt 6= 0 at the time t between 0 and T . However, after he
changes his policy, he loses his reputation.
The policymaker’s loss function is described by a quadratic discounted expected loss func-
tion of the form:
Λ = E
∫ T
0
e−ρ·t
[1
2
θ
(
yt − y¯t − kt
)2
+
1
2
π2t
]
dt, (1)
where ρ is the discount factor with 0 < ρ < 1, yt is aggregate output, y¯t is the economy’s natural
rate of output, and kt is the distortion, which is equal αy¯t, α > 0. θ is a positive constant
that represents the relative weight put by the policymaker on output expansions relative to
inflation stabilization. Here, without loss of generality, the target inflation π is assumed to be
zero. Marco-welfare function (1) has played an important role in the literature, and means that
the policymaker desires to stabilize both output around y¯t + kt, which exceeds the economy’s
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equilibrium output of y¯t by kt, and inflation around zero.
Here, we assume that y¯t = Xt and dXt = σdBt, X0 = x, where Bt is 1-dimensional
Brownian motion and σ is the diffusion coefficient.
The policymaker’s objective is to minimize this discounted expected loss function (1) sub-
ject to the constraint imposed by a Lucas-type aggregate supply function, the so-called Phillips
curve, which describes the relationship between output and inflation in each period:
yt − y¯t = a(πt − πet ) + ut, (2)
where a is a positive constant that represents the effect of a money surprise on output, and ut is
a bounded random variable with E[ut] = 0, Var[ut] = σ
2
u, |ut| ≤M1 for all t and cov(us, ut) = 0,
for t 6= s, which represents the shock at time t. And we assume that y¯t and ut are independent.
We also assume that the policymaker can observe ut and Xt prior to setting πt.
The public has complete information about the policymaker’s objectives. It is assumed that
the public forms his expectations rationally, and thus, the assumption of rational expectation
implicitly defines the loss function for the public as E[πt − πet ]2. The public’s objective is to
minimize this expected inflation error. Given the public’s understanding of the policymaker’s
decision problem, its choice of πe is optimal.
We first examine the “one-shot” game. The single-period loss function ℓt for the policy-
maker is
ℓt(πt, π
e
t ) =
1
2
θ(yt − y¯t − kt)2 + 1
2
π2t =
1
2
θ[a(πt − πet )− αXt + ut]2 +
1
2
π2t . (3)
The equilibrium concept in this game is noncooperative Nash. Then, the policymaker minimizes
ℓt by taking π
e
t as given, and thus, we have the best response function for the policymaker:
πDt =
aθ
1 + a2θ
(aπet + αXt − ut). (4)
The public is assumed to understand the incentive facing the policymaker so it uses (4) in
forming its expectations about inflation so that
πet = Eπ
D
t =
aθ
1 + a2θ
(aπet + αEXt). (5)
Solving (5) for πet , we get the unique Nash equilibrium π
e∗
t = Eπ
D∗
t = aθαEXt. Thus, as
long as EXt 6= 0, the policymaker has incentives to use the discretion rule although the loss at
πet = πt = 0 is lower than at π
e∗
t = Eπ
D∗
t . This is the problem of time inconsistency.
A potential solution to the above time inconsistency problem is to force the policymaker to
bear some consequence penalties if he deviates from his announced policy of low inflation. One
of such penalties that may take is a loss of reputation. If the policymaker deviates from the low-
inflation solution, credibility is lost and the public expects high inflation in the future. That is,
the public expects zero-inflation as long as policymaker has fulfilled the inflation expectation in
the past. However, if actual inflation exceeds what was expected, the public anticipates that the
policymaker will apply discretion in the future. So, the public forms its expectation according
to the trigger strategy: Observing “good” behavior induces the expectation of continual good
behavior and a single observation of “bad” behavior triggers a revision of expectations.
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2.2 The Optimal Stopping Problem for Policymaker
In order to solve the time inconsistency problem by using the reputation approach, we first
incorporate the policymaker’s loss minimization problem into a general optimal stopping time
problem. During any time in [0, T ], the policymaker has the right to reveal his type (discretion
or zero-inflation). Because he has the right but not the obligation to reveal his type, we can
think it is an option for the policymaker. So, the policymaker’s decision problem is to choose
a best time τ ∈ [0, T ] to exercise this option.
The policymaker considers the following optimal stopping problem: find τ∗ such that
L∗(x) = inf
τ
Ex
[ ∫ τ
0
f(t,Xt)dt+ g(τ,Xτ )
]
= Ex
[ ∫ τ∗
0
f(t,Xt)dt+ g(τ
∗, Xτ∗)
]
, (6)
where
f(s,Xt) =
1
2
θe−ρ·s(αXt − ut)2 (7)
is the instantaneous loss function for the policymaker when he uses the zero-inflation rate, and
g(s,Xτ ) = e
−ρsEXτ
[ ∫ T
s
e−ρ(t−s)
[θ
2
[a(πDt − πet )− αXt + ut]2 +
πD
2
t
2
]
dt
]
(8)
is the expected loss function for policymaker, in which he begins to use the discretion rule at
time s. We assume that g(·, ·) is a bounded function, i.e., g(·, ·) ≤M for some constant M .
Let {Ft} be a filtration of Bt. We assume that the public’s strategy πet for t > τ is {Fτ}-
adapted. This means that when the public forms their expectation at time t, they know the
natural rate at τ .
To compute g(τ,Xτ ), substituting (4) into (8), we have
g(τ,Xτ ) = e
−ρτEXτ
[ ∫ T
τ
e−ρ(t−τ)
[θ
2
[a(πDt − πet )− αXt + ut]2 +
1
2
πD
2
t
]
dt
]
=
1
2
θ
1 + a2θ
e−ρτEXτ
[ ∫ T
τ
e−ρ(t−τ)
(
αXt − ut + aπet
)2
dt
]
=
θα2
2(1 + a2θ)
e−ρτ ·
{
EXτ
[ ∫ T
τ
e−ρ(t−τ)X2t dt
]
+ 2αaπetE
Xτ
[ ∫ T
τ
e−ρ(t−τ)Xtdt
]
+(a2πet
2 + σ2u)E
Xτ
[ ∫ T
τ
e−ρ(t−τ)dt
]}
. (9)
We now calculate the conditional expectation for X2t and Xt. Let A be the generator of Itoˆ
diffusion dXt = b(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dB (with b(Xt) ≡ 0). Then,
Af =
∑
i
bi
∂f
∂xi
+
1
2
∑
i,j
(σσT )i,j
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
=
1
2
∑
i,j
(σσT )i,j
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
.
Then, by Dynkin’s formula (cf. Øksendal [6], p. 118), we have
EXτ [Xt] = Xτ + E
Xτ
[ ∫ t
τ
AXsds
]
= Xτ , (10)
EXτ [X2t ] = X
2
τ + E
Xτ
[ ∫ t
τ
AX2sds
]
= X2τ + σ
2(t− τ). (11)
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Substituting (10) and (11) into (9), we have
g(τ,Xτ ) =
1
2
θ
1 + a2θ
{
σ2
[ 1
ρ2
(e−ρτ − e−ρT )− 1
ρ
(T − τ)e−ρT
]
+[(αXτ + aπ
e
τ )
2 + σ2u]
1
ρ
(e−ρτ − e−ρT )
}
. (12)
Note that, if we define
f1(s,Xt) = −f(s,Xt), g1(s,Xτ ) = −g(s,Xτ) +M ≥ 0,
then, the loss minimization problem in (6) can be reduced to the following maximization prob-
lem: find τ∗, such that
G∗0(x) = sup
τ∈[0,T ]
Ex
[ ∫ τ
0
[−f(t,Xt)]dt− g(τ,Xτ ) +M
]
= sup
τ∈[0,T ]
Ex
[ ∫ τ
0
f1(t,Xt)dt+ g1(τ,Xτ )
]
. (13)
In the following, we will use the optimal stopping approach to solve the optimization
problem (13).
2.3 Solve the Optimal Stopping Problem
In order to solve the policymaker’s optimization problem (13) by using a standard frame-
work of the optimal stopping problem involving an integral (cf. Øksendal [6], p.213), we make
the following transformations. Let
Wτ =
∫ τ
0
f1(t,Xt)dt+ w, w ∈ R,
and define the Itoˆ diffusion Zt = Z
(s,x,w)
t in R
3 by
Zt =


s+ t
Xt
Wt

 ,
for t ≥ 0. Then,
dZt =


dt
dXt
dWt

 =


1
0
− 12θe−ρt(Xt − k)2

 dt+


0
σ
0

dBt, Z0 = (s, x, w).
So Zt is an Itoˆ diffusion starting at z := Z0 = (s, x, w). Let R
z = R(s,x,w) denote the probability
law of {Zt} and let Ez = E(s,x,w) denote the expectation with respect to Rz. In terms of Zt
the problem (13) can be written as
G∗0(x) = G
∗(0, x, 0) = sup
τ
E(0,x,0)[Wτ + g1(τ,Xτ )] = supE
(0,x,0)[G(Zτ )],
which is a special case of the problem
G∗(s, x, w) = sup
τ
E(s,x,w)[Wτ + g1(τ,Xτ )] = supE
(s,x,w)[G(Zτ )],
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with
G(z) = G(s, x, w) := w + g1(s, x).
Then, for
f1(s, x) = −1
2
θe−ρ·s(αx − us)2,
g1(s, x) = −1
2
θ
1 + a2θ
{
σ2
[ 1
ρ2
(e−ρs − e−ρT )− 1
ρ
(T − s)e−ρT
]
+[(αx+ aπes)
2 + σ2u]
1
ρ
(e−ρs − e−ρT )
}
+M,
and G(s, x, w) = w + g1(s, x), the AZ of Zt is given by
AZG =
∂G
∂s
+
1
2
σ2
∂2G
∂x2
− 1
2
θe−ρs(x− k)2 ∂G
∂w
=
1
2
θ
1 + a2θ
[(αx + aπes)
2 + σ2u]e
−ρs − 1
2
θ(αx − us)2e−ρs
=
1
2
θ
1 + a2θ
[(αx + aπes)
2 + σ2u − (1 + a2θ)(αx − us)2]e−ρs. (14)
Let
U = {(s, x, w) : G(s, x, w) < G∗(s, x, w)},
and
V = {(s, x, w) : AG(x) > 0}.
Then, by (14), we have
V = {(s, x, w) : AZG(s, x, w) > 0}
= R× {x : (αx + aπes)2 + σ2u > (1 + a2θ)(αx − us)2} ×R. (15)
Remark 2.1 Øksendal ([6], p.205) shows that V ⊂ U , which means that it is never
optimal to stop the process before it exits from V . If we choose a suitable πe(x), such that
(αx + aπes)
2 + σ2u > (1 + a
2θ)(αx − us)2, then, we have U = V = R3. Therefore, any stopping
time less than T will not be optimal for all (s, x, w) ∈ V , and thus, τ∗ = T is the optimal
stopping time. We will use this fact to study the time inconsistency problem of the monetary
policy game in the following sections.
3 The Equilibrium Behavior of the Monetary Policy Game
In order to study the equilibrium behavior of the game, we first give the following lemma,
which shows that the policymaker will keep the zero-inflation policy when the public uses trigger
strategies and reputation penalties imposed by the public large enough.
Lemma 3.1 Let τ = inf{s > 0 : πs 6= 0}. Then, for all x, any trigger strategy of the
public {πet (x)} which has the form
πet =


0 if t = 0,
0 if 0 < t < τ,
πe(x) ∈ {h : (αx+ aπes)2 + σ2u > (1 + a2θ)(α|x| +M)2} if t > s and t ≥ τ,
(16)
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discourages the policymaker from attempting surprise inflation.
Proof For each x ∈ R, if we choose any πe ∈ {h : (αx+aπes)2+σ2u > (1+a2θ)(αx−us)2},
we have
(αx + aπes)
2 + σ2u > (1 + a
2θ)(αx − us)2 for all x ∈ R.
Then, V in (15) becomes V = R3, and thus on any stopping time less then T is not optimal
for the policymaker. Hence, τ∗ = T . Thus, when the public applies this trigger strategy, it is
never optimal for policymaker to stop the zero-inflation policy.
Although there are (infinitely) many trigger strategies given in Lemma 1, that can dis-
courage the policymaker from attempting surprise inflation, most of them are not optimal for
the public in terms of minimizing the public’s expected inflation error (πt − πet )2. To rule
out those non-optimal strategies, we have to impose some assumptions how the public forms
an expectation and what an equilibrium solution should be used to describe the public’s self-
interested behavior. Different assumptions on the public’s behavior may result in different
optimal solutions. In the following, we introduce a concept of sequentially rational equilibrium
solution.
Suppose the policymaker knows the distribution of the natural rate, Xt, exactly, that is,
dP˜G = dP,
where P˜G is the belief of the policymaker for the movement of the shock and P is the measure
of the natural rate.
We suppose that the public does not know the distribution of the natural rate, but it
believes that P˜P is absolutely continuous with respect to P , which means that if an event does
not occur in probability, then the public will believe that this event will not happen.
Then, by Randon-Nikodym Theorem (Lipster & Ahiryaev [5], p.13), there exists Randon-
Nikodym derivative M(t) such that
dP˜P =M(t)dP (a.s.),
and M(t) is a martingale and bounded both from above and below (i.e., M1 ≤M(t) ≤M2 for
every 0 ≤ t ≤ T ). This means that, whenever new information becomes available, the belief of
the public is adjusted. We can interprete M(t) to be the information structure of the society,
which is a measurement of how the public knows the real natural rate.
We suppose that M(t) is P -square-integrable and Xt is P˜
P -integrable. We also suppose
that 〈Xt,M(t)〉 = 0 heuristically. This assumption can be interpreted as: the history of the
natural rate can’t help the public to predict the movement of the future natural rate in general.
We denote by E˜ the expectation operator with respect to P˜P .
A strategy (τ, {πt, πet }) is said to be a sequentially rational equilibrium strategy for the
dynamic model defined above if
(i) the belief of the public for the movement of the natural rate Xt, P˜
P , satisfying Bayes’
rule
E˜[Xt|Fs] = 1
M(s)
E[XtM(t)|Fs], (17)
for all s < t;
(ii) the expectation of the public is rational πet = E
XsπDt := E˜[π
D
t |Fs] for all s < t;
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(iii) it optimizes the objectives of the public and the policymaker.
Now, we use this type of sequentially rational equilibria to study the time inconsistency
problem in monetary policy. Proposition 3.1 below shows the existence of such equilibria.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose the shocks {Xt} satisfy the inequality
(αx + a2θαXt)
2 + σ2u > (1 + a
2θ)(α|x| +M)2 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ R. (18)
Let (τ, {πs}) be the strategy of the policymaker, where τ is the first time that the policymaker
changes its policy from zero-inflation to discretion rule, i.e., τ = inf{s > 0 : πs 6= 0}. Let the
strategy of the public {(πet )} be given by
πet =


0 if t = 0,
0 if 0 < t < τ ,
aθαXτ if t ≥ τ .
(19)
Then, (τ∗, {π∗t , πe∗t }) with τ∗ = T , π∗t = 0 and πe∗t = 0, for all t ≥ 0 is a sequentially rational
equilibrium strategy for the policymaker and the public.
Proof To prove (τ, {πt, πet }) defined above results in a sequentially rational equilibrium,
τ∗ = T , π∗t = 0, and π
e∗
t = 0 for all t ≥ 0, and we need to show that (i) it satisfies Bayes’
rule, (ii) the rational expectation condition holds: πet = E
XτπDt := E˜[π
D
t |Fτ ], (iii) πet ∈ {h :
(αx + ah)2 + σ2u > (1 + a
2θ)(α|x| +M)2}, and (iv) (τ∗, {π∗t , πe∗t }) optimizes the objectives of
the public and the policymaker.
We first claim that the public updates its belief by Bayes’ rule. Indeed, because M(t) is a
martingale, and for s < t, Xt is a P˜
P -integrable random variable, then, by Lemma of Shreve
& Kruzhilin ([11], p.438), the Bayes’ Rule holds
E˜[Xt|Fs] = 1
M(s)
E[XtM(t)|Fs].
To show πet = E
XτπDt , first note that Xt and M(t) are square-integrable martingale,
using the fact that XtM(t)− 〈Xt,M(t)〉 is a martingale (Karatzas & Shreve([3], p.31)) and the
assumption 〈Xt,M(t)〉 = 0, we can get that XtM(t) is a martingale by Bayes’ rule
E˜[Xt|Fτ ] = 1
M(τ)
E[XtM(t)|Fτ ] = 1
M(τ)
XτM(τ) = Xτ ,
which means {Xt} is also a martingale under P˜P . Because the policymaker’s best response
function is given by
πDt =
aθ
1 + a2θ
(aπet + αx − us),
{Xt} is a martingale under P˜P , and πet = aθαXτ is a complete information at time t, we have
EXτπDt = E
Xτ
aθ
1 + a2θ
(aπet + αx− us) =
aθ
1 + a2θ
(aπet + αE
XτXt)
=
aθ
1 + a2θ
(aπet + αXτ ). (20)
Substituting πet = aθαXτ into (20), we have E
XτπDt =
aθ
1+a2θ (a
2θαXτ + αXτ ) = aθαXτ = π
e
t .
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Now, if condition (18) is satisfied, then we have (αx+ aπes)
2 + σ2u > (1 + a
2θ)(α|x|+M)2
and thus, πet ∈ {h : (αx + ah)2 + σ2u > (1 + a2θ)(α|x| +M)2} for all x ∈ R with x 6= k. Then,
by Lemma 3.1, the optimal stopping time is τ∗ = T . Therefore, we must have π∗t = 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ].
Because the public only cares about his inflation prediction errors, so πet = aθαXt mini-
mizes the public’s expected lost when the policy change occurs at time t in this game. Hence,
if both the policymaker and public believe that future shocks will grow enough to make the
inequality (18) holds, the threat of the public is credible. Hence, we must have πe∗t = 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ] because τ∗ = T . Thus, we have shown that the trigger strategies (τ, {πt, πet }) result
in a sequentially rational equilibrium, which is τ∗ = T , π∗t = 0, and π
e∗
t = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Thus, Proposition 3.1 implies that, as long as natural rate Xt is big enough, the public can
use a trigger strategy to induce a zero-inflation sequentially rational equilibrium. Of course,
the assumption that (αx+ aπes)
2 + σ2u > (1 + a
2θ)(α|x|+M)2 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ R with
x 6= k seems very strong. Proposition 4.1 in the next section shows that this is a reasonable
assumption. As long as this inequality holds for the initial natural rate x, both the public and
the policymaker will have a strong belief that it will be true for all t ∈ (0, T ] and x ∈ R.
4 Stochastically Stable Equilibrium
In this section, we study the robustness of sequentially rational equilibrium. In order to
get the sequentially rational equilibrium in Proposition 3.1, we impose the assumption that
(αx + a2θαXt)
2 + σ2u > (1 + a
2θ)(α|x| +M)2 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T and x ∈ R. It seems that the
concept of sequentially rational equilibrium is not satisfactory as a predictor of long-run behavior
when the game is subjected to persistent stochastic shocks. So, we introduce the concept of
sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium. (In determinate dynamic systems, in
order to analyze the dynamic behavior, the concepts of Lyapunov stable and asymptotically
stable are always used. For stochastic evolution system, Foster and Young [2] and Young [13]
first introduced the concept of stochastic stability. But the concept in their papers is different
from ours.)
Definition 4.1 Let {S : (y, z ∈ R2)} be the set of sequentially rational equilibria of a
dynamic game under the shock Xt, we say S is a sequentially rational stochastically stable equi-
librium set if Ex[τ ] =∞, where τ = inf{t : (yt, zt) /∈ S}, and S is a sequentially stochastically
unstable rational equilibrium set if Ex[τ ] <∞.
Loosely speaking, the sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibria of a dynamic
game are those equilibria such that the expected time to depart from them is infinite.
Lemma 4.1 Let B = {Xt : (αx+ a2θαXt)2+ σ2u > (1+ a2θ)(α|x|+M)2 for t ≥ 0}, and
let η = inf{t > 0 : Xt /∈ B} be the first time Xt exits from B. Suppose that x ∈ B. Then, we
have
Ex[η] =∞,
for all x ∈ R.
Proof Solving (αx + a2θαXt)
2 + σ2u > (1 + a
2θ)(x − ut)2 for Xt, we have
Xt >
1
a2θα
[−σ2u − αx+
√
1 + a2θ(α|x| +M)],
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or
Xt <
1
a2θα
[(−σ2u − αx −
√
1 + a2θ(α|x| +M)].
Let C = 1
a2θα
[ut − αx+
√
1 + a2θ(α|x| +M)] and D = 1
a2θα
[(ut − αx−
√
1 + a2θ(α|x|+M)].
Because X0 = x ∈ B for all x ∈ R, there are two cases to be considered: 1) x > C and 2)
x < D.
Case 1) x > C. Let ηc = inf{t > 0: Xt ≤ C} and ηn be the first exit time from the
interval
{Xt : C ≤ Xt ≤ n},
for every integer n with n > C. We first show that P x(Xηn = C) =
n−x
n−C
and P x(Xηn = n) =
x−C
n−C
. Consider the function h ∈ C20 (R) defined by h(x) = x for C ≤ x ≤ n (C20 (R) means the
functions in C2(R) with compact support). By Dynkin’s formula,
Ex[h(Xηn)] = h(x) + E
x
[ ∫ ηn
0
Ah(Xs)ds
]
= h(x) = x, (21)
we have
CP x(Xηn = C) + nP
x(Xηn = n) = x.
Thus,
P x(Xηn = C) =
n− x
n− C ,
and
P x(Xηn = n) = 1− P x(Xηn = C) =
x− C
n− C .
Now, consider h ∈ C20 (R) such that h(x) = x2 for C ≤ x ≤ n. Applying Dynkin’s formula
again, we have
Ex[h(Xηn)] = h(x) + E
x
[ ∫ ηn
0
Ah(Xs)ds
]
= x2 + σ2Ex[ηn], (22)
and thus,
σ2Ex[ηn] = C
2P x(Xηn = C) + n
2P x(Xηn = n)− x2.
Hence, we have
Ex[ηn] =
1
σ2
[
C2
n− x
n− C + n
2 x− C
n− C − x
2
]
.
Letting n → ∞, we conclude that P x(Xηn = n) = x−Cn−C → 0 and ηc = lim ηn < ∞ a.s.
Therefore, we have
Ex[ηc] = lim
n→∞
Ex[ηn] =∞.
Case 2) X0 = x < D. Define ηD = inf{t > 0; Xt ≥ D}. Let ηn be the first exit time
from the interval
{Xt : −n ≤ Xt ≤ D},
for every integer n with −n < D. By the same method, we can prove that
Ex[ηn] =
1
σ2
[
D2
n+ x
n+D
+ n2
D − x
n+D
− x2
]
.
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Letting n → ∞, we conclude that P x(Xηn = n) = D−xn+D → 0 and ηD = lim ηn < ∞ a.s.,
and thus,
Ex[ηD] = lim
n→∞
Ex[ηn] =∞.
Thus, in either case, we have Ex[η] =∞.
Lemma 4.1, thus, implies that, because the expected exit time from B is infinite, the
policymaker will believe that the future natural rate will stay in B forever, and consequently
he will likely make decisions and behave according to this belief. As a result, the sequentially
rational equilibrium will likely appear in the game. So, in this sense, we can regard B as an
absorbing class for Xt as long as x ∈ B.
What would happen if the initial shock x is not in B? We have the following proposition:
Lemma 4.2 Define τ = inf{t > 0 : Zt ∈ B}. Then, for x /∈ B, i.e., a(1− θ) ≥ 2, we have
Ex[τ ] =
a(1− θ)− 2
σ2aθ
(k − x)2.
Proof Because x 6∈ B, we have D ≤ x ≤ C. Define τC = inf{t > 0 : Xt ≥ C}
and τD = inf{t > 0 : Xt ≤ D}. Then, τ = τc ∧ τD := min{τc, τD}. We first show that
P x(Xτ = C) =
x−D
C−D
and P x(Xτ = D) =
C−x
C−D
. Consider h ∈ C20 (R) such that h(x) = x for
D ≤ x ≤ C. By Dynkin’s formula,
Ex[h(Xτc∧τD)] = h(x) + E
x
[ ∫ τc∧τD
0
Ah(Xs)ds
]
= h(x) = x, (23)
we have
CP x(Xτ = C) +DP
x(Xτ = D) = x.
Thus,
P x(Xτ = C) =
x−D
C −D,
and so,
P x(Xτ = D) = 1− P x(Xτ = C) = C − x
C −D.
Now consider h ∈ C20 (R) such that h(x) = x2 for D ≤ x ≤ C. By Dynkin’s formula:
Ex[h(Xτc∧τD)] = h(x) + E
x
[ ∫ τcΛτD
0
Ah(Xs)ds
]
= h(x) + σ2Ex[τc ∧ τD], (24)
we have
σ2Ex[τc ∧ τD] = C2P x(Xτ = C) +D2P x(Xτ = D)− x2,
and then,
Ex[τc ∧ τD] = 1
σ2
[
C2
x−D
C −D +D
2 C − x
C −D − x
2
]
=
1
σ2
[(C +D)x − CD − x2]
=
2x
σ2aθ
[(1 + aθ)k − x]− 1
σ2a2θ2
[(1 + aθ)k − x]2 + 1 + a
2θ
σa2θ2
(x − k)2 − 1
σ
x2
=
1
σ2a2θ2
{[(1 + aθ)k − x][2xaθ − (1 + aθ)k + x]− a2θ2x2 + (1 + a2θ)(k − x)2}
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=
1
σ2a2θ2
{−(1 + aθ)2k2 − (1 + 2aθ)x2 + (1 + aθ)kx+ (1 + aθ)(1 + 2aθ)xk
−a2θ2x2 + (1 + a2θ)(x− k)2}
=
1
σ2a2θ2
{−(1 + aθ)2k2 − (1 + aθ)2x2 + 2(1 + aθ)2kx+ (1 + a2θ)(x − k)2}
=
1
σ2a2θ2
{−(1 + aθ)2(k − x)2 + (1 + a2θ)(x− k)2}
=
a(1− θ)− 2
σ2aθ
(k − x)2 ≥ 0, (25)
by noting that a(1 − θ) ≥ 2.
Notice that, the bigger the variance of the natural rate (measured by σ), the faster the
convergence rate. From Lemma 4.2, the expected time of entering B, Ex[τ ] = Ex[τc ∧ τD] is a
finite number. Suppose the public has the same belief as the policymaker. There are two cases
to be considered: 1) Ex[τ ] ≥ T . In this case, the policymaker likely believes that Xt 6∈ B for all
t ∈ [0, T ], and thus a sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium will not likely exist.
2) Ex[τ ] < T . In this case, we should not expect the zero-inflation stationary monetary policy
for the time period [0, Ex[τ ]] since Xt 6∈ B for all t ∈ [0, Ex[τ ]]. However, once Xt enters B at
the first time Ex[τ ], we can regard Xτ as a new starting point. Then, by Lemma 4.1, both the
policymaker and the public will believe that Xt will stay in B for all t ∈ [Ex[τ ], T ], and thus,
we can expect to have a zero inflation stationary monetary policy on [Ex[τ ], T ]. This implies
that, although we do not have a time consistency policy on the whole time horizon [0, T ] when
x 6∈ B, we could have a time consistency monetary policy beyond the point Ex[τ ]. In other
words, one will have an nonstationary policy period if the initial shock x 6∈ B; however, after
a certain point τ , the monetary policy may become stationary. Thus, the time inconsistency
may happen at most once.
Summarizing the above discussions, we can draw the following conclusions:
(i) If the initial natural rate x is in B, one can expect all future shocks Xt are in B and
thus, can expect a stationary zero-inflation outcome by the sequentially rational behavior.
(ii) If the initial natural rate x is not in B, whether or not we can expect the monetary
policy to have a tendency to become stable depending on T , the lifetime of the policymaker. If
the expected first entry time to B, Ex[τ ] ≥ T , we do not expect a stationary monetary policy
and thus we have the time inconsistency problem. If Ex[τ ] < T , we may expect a stationary
monetary policy beyond the entry point Ex[τ ], and monetary policy becomes stationary. Thus,
the monetary policy may jump at most once.
Combine Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Let (τ, {πs}) be the strategy of the policymaker, where τ is the first
time that the policymaker changes his policy from zero-inflation to discretion rule, i.e., τ =
inf{s > 0 : πs 6= 0}. Let the strategy of the public {(πet )} be given by
πet =


0 if t = 0,
0 if 0 < t < τ,
aθ(k −Xτ ) if t ≥ τ.
(26)
Then, (τ∗, {π∗t , πe∗t }) with τ∗ = T , π∗t = 0, and πe∗t = 0 for all t ≥ 0 is a sequentially rational
stochastically stable equilibrium strategy for the policymaker and the public.
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Then, we can see that the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a
sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium and the uncooperative equilibrium is a
sequentially rational stochastically unstable equilibrium. In the long run, the zero inflation
monetary policies are inherently more stable than the discretionary rules, and once established,
they tend to persist for longer periods of time. Thus, for this continuous time dynamic stochastic
game, sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium behavior can be predicted for any
initial natural rate.
5 Conclusion
This article develops a model to examine the equilibrium behavior of monetary time incon-
sistency problem in a continuous time economy with stochastic natural rate and endogenized
distortion. First, we introduce the notion of sequentially rational equilibrium and show that
the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies in a stochas-
tic setting. We provide the conditions for the existence of sequentially rational equilibrium.
Then, the concept of sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium is introduced. We
compare the relative stability between the so called cooperative behavior and the so-called un-
cooperative behavior, and show that the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game
is a sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium and the uncooperative equilibrium
is sequentially rational stochastically unstable equilibrium. In the long run, the zero inflation
monetary policies are inherently more stable than the discretion rules, and once established,
they tend to persist for longer periods of time.
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